Author : J. V. Hodgkinson F. C. A. Chartered
Accountant UPDATES : June 2009. This website commenced in August 2007 as a review of "the worst drought in 100 years". Apart from summer rainfall it encompassed the actions and worth to our water supply of "uncommon events" and demonstrated how the "worst drought" declaration misinterpreted their action. "Uncommon events" is a term applied by the dam managers to Monsoons, Cyclones and large scale rain depressions. The term is a misnomer. Large scale rain depressions are quite common and are by far our major water supply. "Uncommon events" pay no attention to
the time of the year, the summer months December to March acquiring just over
50% of a year's rainfall. The April and May 2009
inflows,
although well below their SEQWater "uncommon event" definition in rainfall,
are
a small sample of their activity in the catchments. One should learn from these
events and come to understand that there is a far greater unused water supply
available in the current system that now goes over the dam walls from these "uncommon events" than the
entire Traveston Dam project of all three stages. |
|
| Click the photos to expand. The back button to return June 2009 : Following the May 2009 "uncommon event" in which the Premier declared SEQ a disaster area, it is time to make a concise review. It is completely on this Index (Home) page and divided into two sections:- * The volume of our available water supply and its individual sources. The section includes the problems that occurred during the life of the Wivenhoe Dam and are still occurring due to a lack of understanding of our major water source, "uncommon events". A great deal of this major resource is now lost over the spillways. * More surplus water than the Traveston all three stages and a review of Premier Bligh's guarantee. Based on official Engineering evidence, there is more surplus water in the Wivenhoe/Somerset/Borumba expanded, available within a few years at less cost than in the Traveston proposal all three stages to be completed by 2050. We will review the evidence so that you can form your own conclusions and also review how the Premier Bligh's guarantee to the people of the Mary Valley of this comparison was handled and its outcome. As we will see, the May 2009 event only covered the catchments to a limited degree missing the full force of this event. It still gives us a view of the power of an "uncommon event". ******************************************************** Index : If you click on a document to examine it remember the number of the paragraph. When you click the back button to return, it will bring you back to this page. Click on the page numbered underlined index section that you were examining to return directly to it:- The worst drought in 100 years ? Examination of the reason for our depleted dams was carried out in the original "Home" page. That page is maintained in CURIOUS DROUGHT Tab where the reason for the depletion is fully examined and flows on to this Index. The volume of our water supply and how it is misunderstood
The mechanics of the proposal
16. Original proposal The use of the Hydrology and Engineering
reports by all sections of Government and our evidence of the lack of precise
and agreed "terms of reference", usual in such reports,
which negated
the important aspects of those reports.
23. Main components for
examination
Conclusion END OF INDEX ************************************************************** * Volume of water available and the problems that have occurred (1) A snapshot of our natural and reconstituted water supply (1.01) Years to fill the Wivenhoe/Somerset from scratch without withdrawal of water "U ncommon events" that measure up to the rainfall requirements of SEQWater and listed in the picture
on right, have the capacity to fill our
dams from scratch to overflow in a few days.
The picture on the left is a comparison
with other sources of our water supply and the years that it would take them to
fill an empty dam.
It is the overflow from "uncommon events" that we
are concentrating upon. Government appointed Engineers GHD identified an
additional 80,000ML\a available if the Wivenhoe dam wall was raised (their
findings in the second section). This is
flood water not now retained. It did not proceeded due to complications with
existing infrastructure. This is a minimum volume available as it does not count flood
water that most certainly would overflow even the raised dam wall. (1.02) The story of the Wivenhoe's short life The story of the Wivenhoe for its short life of 23
years from commissioning in 1986, is told in this
picture with (1.03) The most recent May 2009 event plus the three before it The most recent May 2009 event failed to qualify as an
uncommon event. As
we have all experienced this May 2009 event, it gives one an appreciation of the
volume of water produced by the events in the short life of the
Wivenhoe. This recent May 2009 low pressure system
had Premier Bligh declaring "the worst It had the capacity to rival the experience of the Wivenhoe and overflow the dams but performed to a limited degree. These four small events, which produced 49% of the 57% rise in our dam levels, plus the 6 majors events in the short life of the Wivenhoe are concrete evidence that "uncommon events" large and small are our major water supply. It agrees with SEQWater's Mr
Drury's observation in the picture on the left that
(2) Mathematics and frequency of "uncommon events" The frequency of "uncommon events" prepared by me from the Bureau of Meteorology records shows that that they are frequent and not uncommon. The observation of "uncommon events" is more mathematical
than hydrological. They are observed on average
every 3.7 years and only for a few days of high intensity saturation
rainfall.
(3) Guesswork of "uncommon events" elimination by large storage The guesswork is eliminated by having storage in the Borumba Dam, expanded to 2,000,000ML or almost twice the size of the Wivenhoe and larger than the Burdekin, for all major dams in SEQ as they overflow with substantial loss of available water. This is a far superior outcome in water volume and cost than the Traveston proposal. (4) Next "uncommon event" on relatively full dams With the Dams currently at 75% level, summer rainfall and the
desalination plant should maintain the level around that figure. The next "uncommon
event" that measures up to those 6 events in the life of the Wivenhoe will
heavily overflow the dams and bringing the Traveston proposal into serious
question. (5) Decision makers In my view, we have had a succession of leaders and those responsible for our water supply appearing to have not fully understood, or were not aware of, the relationship of "uncommon events" and the Wivenhoe/Somerset system. The 19 years of decisions or no decisions are interrelated and have subsequently proved costly and disruptive to the citizens of SEQ. As a consequence the people of the Mary Valley needlessly face the same predicament. In addition the people of SEQ will permanently lose a valuable asset due to a major storage facility in the Borumba dam being lost in the dam wall footings in stage 2 of the Traveston proposal. *****************************************************
************************************************ Before my mate Bernard from one of the
Sunshine Coast ALP branches gets upset, I have to say that I found the problems
that they faced more difficult to solve than a Rubik Cube. The Bureau of
Meteorology facts were not
agreeing with my eyesight of a depleted dam. The folks involved were, and
some still are, pragmatic politicians who rely on the opinions of the electorate.
I will present the facts on
which I formed my view so that you may form your own opinion. (6) The Puzzle and good outcomes of the solution The puzzle is complex. It is laid out in the CURIOUS DROUGHT tab being the original Index (Home) page and tens of thousands of visitors to this site are familiar with it with 78% adding it to their "favourites". The essential elements are that there is two types rainfall that fill our dams. When we examine the solution to the puzzle we will find that more water can be collected and stored between the Wivenhoe/Somerset and the Borumba dam, just over the hill from the Wivenhoe/Somerset, than the Traveston proposal all three stages. The Mary River will run free and partial flood mitigation of Gympie will occur. An added bonus will occur if the short connection from the Borumba to the Northern Interconnector is made, then all major dams in SEQ will have access to storage. (7) Final arbiter that will show how our dams and rainfall engage each other The final arbiter to my conclusions in this website will be "uncommon events" themselves. When the next "uncommon event" fills the Dams to overflow, people will be entitled to observe whether our Leaders know what they are doing. If it does not occur within the periods outlined in this website, the same can be asked of me. With the Dams full, the following "uncommon event" will overflow the dams. My position, if not already clear, will become obvious to all and, in my view, the expensive and irreparable forward planning will come under serious questioning. - I wrote that paragraph before the May 2009 event. As illustrated above, if the low pressure had been a few kilometres to the west it would have been complete with the dams overflowing, instead this paragraph is still current.(8) Alert to Minister Hinchcliffe in my letter 3 weeks before the May 2009 event Extract from my letter to Hon. Mr S. Hinchliffe, Minister for Infrastructure and Planning, sent on the 23rd April 2009 three weeks before the May 2009 event "The way I see it, the difficulty
for you and all who support the Traveston is that on the mathematical
certainty of the return of the “uncommon events” the dams will overflow.
That by itself should have people in SEQ questioning if those in charge
understand what they are doing. Historically there has been 11 “uncommon
events” within 1 year of each other (April 1988 & April 1989 for example)
and there will be a tremendous loss of water over spillways with full dams. In
my view justification of the Traveston will be under severe stress and storage
in the Borumba Dam together with its additional yield, vindicated." I am conscious of Machiavelli's sixteenth century observation that "you cannot win against the Government". His view was that one would make enemies of those who support the status quo and for those who might like a change, they are not sure how it will affect them. However King Canute found he could not win against the "tide". For this exercise substitute "tide" with "uncommon events". The "tide book" is called "Frequency of uncommon events" and appears in the first paragraph. The tide came in in May 2009 and the tide book indicates a reasonable chance that a much higher tide in the catchments will come in again within one year and a 70% chance within 3.7 years. (9) Wivenhoe dam introduced a new set of circumstances The addition of the
Wivenhoe Dam to SEQ water supply in 1986
generated a set of circumstances that were unfamiliar to our decision makers.
Discussions with an Engineer, Our Dam managers, designated as SEQWater to save confusion
with the new corporation Seqwater, have publicly told us that these dams
need what they call "uncommon events" to fill these large dams. It seems
that our past Hydrologists, recognized as The main contributor to our water supply are "uncommon events" and summer rainfall. An understanding of how both interact with our dams is essential in providing a base for decision making. (10) What exactly are "uncommon events" ? It is necessary to have a clear understanding of
"uncommon events". The effects of Monsoons and Cyclones are rare,
however large scale rain depressions are comparatively (11) Understanding is more mathematical than hydrological It is my view, and it is worth restating, that the lack of understanding of "uncommon events" is more mathematical than hydrological. Hydrology determines the point at which the dam will fail to deliver on historical data (HYNF). We are interested in major events contribution to our water supply and more importantly their overflow of the dams which is now lost. Major events that happen every 4 years is something that the human mind can comprehend. Examples are the Olympic Games or World Cup Soccer. The difficulty comes when it becomes an "average" of 4 years and those events occur anywhere from 1 to 14 years apart to produce that average. It is a mathematical equation that most of those events will occur in less than 4 years and very few in the region of 14 years.
The attached "frequency of uncommon events"
designed by me from official Bureau of Meteorology records, records their timing
and severity for the 160 With 70% of uncommon events occurring within 3.7 years, there is a significant surplus of water under any conditions as occurred in the life of the Wivenhoe (see graph just above) where 6 events occurred. There was sufficient water to fill it from scratch and to overflow many times. (12) The circumstances unfamiliar to our decision makers And so it is in relation to our water supply in SEQ that all facets of the equation came into play and, in my view, our best brains were, and still appear to be, oblivious to the actions of "uncommon events". I refer to to the 23 year life of the Wivenhoe Dam 1986, being the date commissioned, to 2009 and also the period before the dam back to 1974. Those events were:- 1974...............................1988..89......92......96......99....2001................2009 The dam level chart above tracks the effects of these 'uncommon events" which are our main water supply. You will note that the period 1974 to 1988 was the longest gap recorded since 1841. When read with the dam level graph, you will also note that 1988 and 1989 filled the dam from scratch to overflow, refilled the dam four times, 3 to overflow, and finally recording 2009 as an event without the accompanying dam overflow. We have just missed 4 events which failed to come fully into the catchments. They were August 2007 brushed the Coast, May of 2008 stayed out to sea and more recently cyclone Hamish also staying out to sea. The April 2009 and, as witnessed above, the May 2009 events did not fully come into the catchments. (13.01) 1989 Ms Goss/Rudd/Swan/Garrett The soon to be Premier Mr Goss and his chief of staff Mr Rudd
(now PM) went to the 1999 The prior gap in "uncommon events" from 1974 to 1988 being 14 years was ignored and by 1992 the dam levels had dropped to 70%. It was clear then that summer rain was insufficient for our needs and, without "uncommon events", dam failure was inevitable. "uncommon events" obliged with continual overflows thus keeping the prospect from view. In February of 2001 they went on their quite normal walkabout thus exposing the 1989 error and the inaction over the intervening years to eliminate this possibility. (13.02) 1996-2007 Ms Beattie and Bligh Premier Beattie had the reasonable attitude to water that
there was plenty of it and it was
I n February 2001 the dams were full from the last "uncommon event". The fall of 22.0% in 2002
did not create any fuss. The 2004 year saw above average Summer rainfall
limiting the drop to 2.1%. In 2005/06 the realisation of the magnitude of the
problem was there for all of us to see in the depleted dams and it appeared that
a major drought was underway in the catchments.
Our Leaders classified the depleted dams as "the worst drought in 100 years". Unfortunately they were the victims of a statistical aberration. You will see in Bureau of Meteorology and Decision Makers that rainfall in he catchments had been comparable with the long term average in the summer months but there was a deficiency of 20% in the low water producing non summer months. The statistical aberration was that rainfall in the catchments had never been lower than 80% of the long term average as verified by the Bureau email in the sections mentioned. So good rainfall could and did end up in the lowest decile being the lowest on record. The decile map, promoted and used to verify the "drought" was that aberration. 2.8 million people in SEQ, including me, believed this to be the case until I checked the facts available in the Bureau of Meteorology. A gain "uncommon events" were the key. This graph shows the rainfall in 6 years lots, being the
period of the "worst drought" , that almost one half of the 20th
Century had experienced the same condition. Those left of centre did not have an
"uncommon event" with one exception out of the 24 "uncommon
events of the 20th century. The remaining 23 are on the right. While they impact on
the overall rainfall to a degree less than expected, the explanation is that 400mm in a few
days being an "uncommon event" is not the same as 4 months of
100mmm. It is the intensity of the rainfall that creates the "uncommon
event".
(13.03) 2005/06 Ms Beattie and Bligh With little room to move, the reaction was the Grid system
which was basically the only alternative as "uncommon events" could
not be relied upon to intervene nor were they Premier Beattie announced that he did not wish to have a situation that we faced occur again and formed the Queensland Climate Change Centre of Excellence (QCCCE) to avoid unexpected climatic events. They proceeded to produce "the drought to 2007" which is examined in the Federation Drought tab. Their formation is evidence that the underlying nature of the perceived "drought" was not understood.Premier Bligh declared the "worst drought on record" officially over then promptly declared SEQ a disaster area (May 2009). Premier Bligh
has declared "the worst drought on record" For the record, the Bureau of Meteorology easily accessible record maps show that for the last 2 years the drought map showed no drought in SEQ. The decile map that the Premier distributed to all SEQ homes in 2007 to convince us of a bad drought, showed average rainfall compared to the long term average. The percentage map showed average rainfall compared to the long term average. Coupling dam levels with "drought" and ignoring the evidence of the hydrological situation is an interesting scenario. In my view, it is Premier Bligh's commitment to "the worst drought in 100 years" that has suppressed the view of the underlying causes, the recognition of which may have produced a better result and not left us with the following legacy. (14) Remaining plank of "Emergency" legislation T he remaining major plank of the "emergency legislation" was and is the Traveston Dam proposal. It is a three stage approach stretching out to 2050 at an approximate cost in today's terms of $3.1 billion including main road relocation for an all up water supply of 150,000ML annually. Stage 1 (70,000ML), on which the Environmental impact study (EIS) is encountering problems with Environmental concerns, has been delayed by the Coordinator General.The forgoing, in my view, illustrates that "uncommon events" were not understood and our major water supply and its bounty is being ignored in forward planning. It requires suitable storage facilities to achieve this.
(15) The advantages of the proposal (the Ron McMah plan)
END OF SECTION ONE Based on official Engineering evidence, there is more surplus water in the Wivenhoe/Somerset/Borumba expanded, available within a few years at less cost than in the Traveston proposal all three stages to be completed by 2050. We will review the evidence so that you can form your own conclusions and also review how the Premier Bligh's guarantee to the people of the Mary Valley of this comparison was handled and its outcome. The review includes * The mechanics of the proposal * The use of the Hydrology and Engineering reports, and amendments thereto, by all sections of Government and our evidence of the lack of precise and agreed "terms of reference", usual in such reports, which contributed to the negation of important aspects of those reports. Back to INDEX
* How much additional water
and where do we store it? How much additional water and where do
we store it? (16) Original proposal There is not much point in determining a problem if one cannot offer a solution. As we shall see, the surplus water is proven by Engineers but where to store and return it to the system at a later stage? Earlier Mr Ron McMah, a grazier from Imbil in the heart of the
Mary Valley, had, at a public meeting, put a proposition to current Premier
Bligh that the Borumba Dam be increased The Deputy Premier Bligh gave him an "iron clad
look-you-in-eye guarantee" that if it stacked up then that would be the way that they would
go. Premier Beattie toured the Borumba Dam with Mr McMah. (17) Scope larger than first thought I was unaware of Ron McMah's plan having been drawn by curiosity to examine "the worst drought in 100 years". The solution required large storage and I was directed to Ron by a friend of long standing Trevor Herse from the Gold Coast. Trevor and I together with Ron in July 2007 followed the review of the dam on the same path as taken by the review of Premier Beattie. This project has been a joint effort of the three of us for the last two years since that review with this website first appearing in August 2007. The combination of the available flood water from "uncommon events" from the Wivenhoe/Somerset system under this research plus the available water from the expanded Borumba to contain the "uncommon events" not only surpassed stage 1 of the Traveston but exceeded the entire three stages of the Traveston proposal. There is some possibility that some or all of the proposed four desalination plant to be installed in the north coast will not be needed saving up to my ballpark estimate of $3.0 billion based on the $1.2 billion Tugun desalination plant. We will now proceed to see if the plan
"stacks up" and follow it with a through with a detailed analysis of
objections raised by Government sources. Bear in mind that an independent
review, free of those who do business with the Government, was part of the McMah proposal. (18) Additional water available Wivenhoe/Somerset Wivenhoe/Somerset Here we have factual calculations by Engineers GHD that conducted a "desktop" review of all Dams and Weirs in SEQ. Examination of the Wivenhoe was based on Department of Natural Resources and Water (DNRW) Historical Yield No Failure (HYNF) conducted in December 2005. They considered the
additional
water that could be harvested by raising the dam wall of HYNF indicates the minimum volume that can be retained without failure based on past rainfall. What we are measuring here is basically flood water from "uncommon events". There is therefore a great deal more water that flows over the raised wall extending the lowest volume significantly higher than 80,000ML on an annualised basis. T he backup to this evidence is the Wivenhoe Dam itself. Six events not only filled the brand
new dam but overflowed 3 out of 4 times that it was replenished.
On its own, the Wivenhoe/Somerset far exceeds the Traveston stage 1 of 70,000ML\a. At our meeting with the now Minister Hinchcliffe in late January 2009 the QWC representatives stated that the yield of the Wivenhoe/Somerset included the flood water. The Minister seemed to agree. It is simply not possible to include in the yield that water that now goes over the dam wall and is not capable of being retained at flood time. It is a proven excess somewhere in region above 80,000ML\a. We will now examine the purposes and contribution of the
Borumba Dam expanded to 2,000,000ML being twice the size of the Wivenhoe. (19) Additional water available Borumba Dam The Borumba Dam is 60klm over the hill from the
Wivenhoe/Somerset in the adjacent Mary
(20) Purpose of the Borumba Dam expanded to 2,000,000ML 1. A primary two way connection to the Wivenhoe/Somerset. A small secondary connection to the Northern Interconnector would provide storage for all our main dams in SEQ.2. Yield in the dam expanded to 2,000,000ML increases from 32,000ML to 82,300ML. Of the additional 52,300ML, 30,500ML is identified by Engineers GHD based on NRM & Water HYNF calculations of February 2006 for a dam of capacity of 460,000ML and carried out specifically for this study (second picture - both yield and study base first 2 lines). The yellow calculations are mine to assist in reading. Raising the dam wall to![]() 2,000,000ML
will produce a further 21,800ML based on existing stream flows and other
evidence as "uncommon events" will not be retained by a dam of
460,000ML. It has a smaller catchment but is hard rock, deep and with little
seepage. For example the 1999 event, being the same as recorded in the
Wivenhoe/Somerset, had the equivalent of one half of Sydney Harbour go over the
dam wall in a single day of a 5 day event. There is supporting evidence at the Borumba
Dam tab.
There is associated evidence of the yield in the North Pine tab. 3. The Mary River would run free. When the Borumba (52,300ML) is considered in conjunction with the Wivenhoe/Somerset (80,000ML) and the yet to be identified significant surplus beyond the HYNF calculation, there is at least the equivalent and, most likely significantly in excess of, the whole Traveston proposal. The Traveston proposal is for three stages totalling 150,000ML and to be built finalising in 2050 at an approximate cost of $3.1 billion including main road relocation.4. There is the added benefit of flood mitigation in Gympie. The expanded dam to 2,000,000ML will withhold 36% of these flood flows from uncommon events being the estimated flood flows from Yabba Creek on which the Dam is situated. See Hydrology Mary V.Back to INDEX (21) Satisfy Most People Although it was not my primary intention to stop the Traveston
proposal, we have a responsibility to the Mary Valley people to utilise all our
resources before prevailing on their way of life. A joint use of the Borumba Dam
expanded to 2,000,000ML is all we ask. This seems to satisfy most people. The
Borumba is the second stage of the Qld Government's Traveston proposal.
"Save the Mary" people have a link to this website and senior
conservation people have approved of this site. (22) Flood water collection and pumping In this area we were assisted by an Engineer who has his name on the Wivenhoe Dam Plaque. He provided extensive calculations on pumping aspects which he has since updated. The GHD report mentioned prior in relation to the Augmentation of the Wivenhoe was also helpful in assessing the operation of holding and pumping these large volumes of water. The plan is extensive and laid out in Final
Solution and EIS tab in order to minimise this index page. The plan is
contained on pages 27 to 41 of my EIS lodged under the alternatives section of
the EIS on stage 1 of the Traveston.
The use of the Hydrology and Engineering reports by all sections of Government and our evidence of the lack of precise and agreed "terms of reference", usual in such reports, which negated the important aspects of those reports. In this section we will see the evidence
of the way we view events unfolding to render the Hydrology and Engineering reports'
ineffectual and the survival and ascendency of the McMah proposal over the
Traveston proposal. We will supply the evidence on which this view is
based so that you may arrive at your own conclusion:- (23) Main components for examination Ignore the imperative to have the Terms Of Reference agreed and proceed with the issue of contracts without the knowledge of the Premier. The Premier and Mr McMah were still negotiating the terms of reference even after the completion of the reports. Attempt to exclude the all important Wivenhoe/Somerset contribution thus placing the reliance squarely on the yield from the Borumba and bringing in the backup of any shortfall being the inclusion of Weirs in the Mary Valley. Provide an addendum to the Hydrology report 8 months after it was completed in an abortive attempt to counter, on mechanical grounds, the realisation that the Wivenhoe/Somerset water was flood water and was within the provision of the Act. The realisation was prompted by letters to the Premier and the appearance of this website well before the date appearing on the report. Deny the yield of the Borumba by handing Mr McMah a yield for a dam 1/2 the size intended and further, dispute Engineers GHD assessment of the yield based on a study done specifically for the assessment by their own DNRW (Department of Natural Resources and Water) Include Weirs in the Mary Valley as the principal component when Mr McMah had placed that aspect as backup only. The subsequent inclusion of the Wivenhoe/Somerset contribution excluded this backup as not necessary. This provision was ignored and added an enormous headline cost and little gain in water supply. (24) Terms of reference for the McMah proposal "Terms of reference (ToR)" are documents that clearly show what is intended and in this case the McMah plan subject to the Premier's guarantee. Hydrology and Engineering consulting firms were required and would proceed on the basis of the ToR. With two parties involved, agreement of the terms is necessary before the consulting instructions are issued. A meeting of officers of the Queensland
Water Commission (QWC) and Ron McMah took place on the 27/11/2006 at the Borumba
Dam site. He was handed the Terms of Both the Hydrology and Engineering reports, which require 4 to 6 weeks to prepare, were completed by the 22nd January 2007. The consultancies had been issued sometime in December 2006 with the QWC Terms Of Reference without agreement by Mr McMah. ( refer report completion dates below). The lack of precision of what was intended had a significant effect on the worth of these reports. ( I have requested the exact dates from the Coordinator General ). (25) Premier Bligh's comments in January 2007 on the need to settle the Terms Of Reference bearing in mind that the consultancies were let sometime in December 2006 and set out just below in "report completion dates". 15th January 2007 (undated but close to ) " I am very keen to expedite the analysis of the proposal as a genuine alternative to the Traveston Crossing Dam, however I am reluctant to expend public funds without having your endorsement of terms of reference" 19th January 2007 "You will appreciate, the assessment of your proposal can only occur when we have a clear and shared understanding of what is to be assessed".31st January 2007 " I am sure that there are a number of people who heard your proposal at the Gympie meeting are anxious for it to be genuinely analysed" . I urge you to meet with officers of the Department to resolve this matter as soon as possible".All of these letters were written while the Hydrology and Engineering reports well under way or completed on the 22nd January 2007.
There was further correspondence between the Premier and Ron McMah with correspondence by the Premier on the 9th February 2007 and a response by Ron McMah on the 15th February 2007. Agreement on the terms of reference
never occurred and, as a consequence, the most important aspects of the reports
were negated. The Premier has been advised
of this situation. (26) Report completion dates for Engineering and Hydrology JWP Engineering report was signed off for
release on the 22nd January 2007. It also acknowledged that the
Hydrology report
was also complete. (E1) Executive Summary of that report 3rd paragraph reads " The two main streams of investigation have been completed - an engineering assessment (scheme optimisation and costs) and a hydrologic assessment (flows, yields and harvesting opportunities)." Confirmation of the dates on which the contracts of Hydrology and Engineering were let has been requested of the Coordinator General. There was an undertaking by the State
Government to publish these reports. The Engineering report was dated the 22nd
January 2007, the Hydrology report the 17th September 2007 and
the Marsden Jacob Financial report the 7th September 2007. The Marsden
Jacob reports deals with Weirs in the Mary Valley which are excluded from this
proposal. I have written to the Coordinator General for
the dates of publication. We first became aware of them on the 16th
January 2008.
(27) Terms of reference set
aside for the exercise and comparison made Let us set aside for the moment Terms Of Reference and for the exercise compare the McMah plan with all three stages of the Traveston both in water supply, cost and delivery. Let us see how this important
volume of water was dealt with. (28) Elimination of the Wivehoe/Somerset from both those January 2007 reports. Both the JWP Engineering and Gilbert and Associates hydrology reports eliminated this inter-dam transfer system in their "Executive Summary" Reports. Bear in mind we are not aware of any precise Terms of reference issued to these firms nor the "advice" offered. (1) Hydrology (Gilbert and Associates) "The alternative
proposed by Mr McMah included consideration of extraction from the
(2) J W P Engineering "Investigations by G&A (Gilbert and Associates) have identified limitations into potential transfers from the Brisbane River to and from an enlarged Borumba, they include :- 1. the limits on
extractions from the Brisbane River system currently proposed in the As a result of the above limitations, detailed engineering investigations into transfers from Brisbane River to and from an enlarged Borumba Dam has not been pursued at this time." (E2) Effectively they had shut out the surplus Wivenhoe/Somerset Flood waters It is my conclusion that they had failed to realise two matters:-
(29) The Water Resource (Moreton) Plan 2007 Act provides ******************************************************* Part 3 Section 11 General outcomes (page 9)
(1) Each of the following is a general outcome for
surface water in the plan
area- PART 10
(pages 57/58)
(a) in relation to the outcomes mentioned in part 3- (A) the extent to which water is being taken under water
entitlements; and (B) the efficiency of present, and expected future, water
use; and (C) emerging requirements for additional water; and (D) alternative water sources including, for example,
recycled water and water savings from improved efficiency of water use; and (E) the likely time frame in which additional water will
be required; and In addition, my view of the Act is that it is designed to accommodate favourable situations that may arise. ****************************************************************** (30) Amendment of Hydrology report - 8 months later I t appears that the realisation of the above came to the Hydrologists and obviously the QWC when Ron McMah's
letter to the Premier dated the 10th September 2007
and ![]() referring
to his letter of the 20th August 2007
requesting a meeting with the Premier to assess new data. This new data was
flood water from the Wivenhoe/Somerset and Borumba expanded to 2,000,000ML as
previously outlined. It was first published in this website in early
August 2007. The Hydrology report appears to have been amended
principally with "Appendix A". Instead of a January
2007 date which the Engineering report still bears, it was dated 17th
September 2007 eight months after its first completion date.
The report still bore the denial of any examination of the system as expressed in detail above with no changes as illustrated above. However I take it that Appendix A was in recognition that surplus water was a serious threat to the survival of the Traveston. " Appendix A" is a review of the system of how the transfers between the Wivenhoe/Somerset and Borumba dams would work. Some very strange assumptions and presumptions were made that seemed to indicate the author was not fully briefed and they are discussed below. Mr McMah had no knowledge of either both reports and the amendment until the 16th January 2008.A request has been made to the Coordinator
General for confirmation of these dates and advice on the circumstances surrounding
this apparent alteration. (31) Three points we agree and disagree on. The Borumba catchment is relatively small (approximately 465 sq km) for
a dam
I agree with the blue content of the statement. "Uncommon events" as SEQWater describes them, generally cover all of South East Queensland at the same time. With regard to the red statement, as we have seen, "uncommon events" occur on average every 3.7 years and in any case sufficient for 28 years supply from Traveston stage 1 and 13 years supply for all three stages of the proposed Traveston Dam. On that basis there would be no need for any stages of the Traveston. Unfortunately it is not true. We are discussing a dam of 2,000,000ML which is larger than the Burdekin. They agree that the Borumba has a limited but efficient catchment. The only times that this would occur is in an 1893 or 1841 type flood. They were 8.5 metres as compared with the 1974 of 5.4 metres which based on stream flows would not have filled the 2,000,000ML dam. The purple statement is not correct. The most likely result is a fill of around 500,000ML or 1/4 of capacity of 2,000,000ML. The spare capacity is the used by the Wivenhoe/Somerset and any other dam connected to the system. The Wivenhoe/Somerset, or any other dam in the system, under considered management can deliver water to the Borumba at any time. The reverse is also true. The two page "appendix A" can be viewed in full with line numbers and comments by me at the Qld Govt Reports tab This aspect was a backup procedure to be utilised if the original plan was inadequate. It was later withdrawn in writing by Mr McMah. Its necessity dissolved with the amount of
surplus flood water in the Wivenhoe/Somerset
(33) Financial and Economic report - Marsden Jacobs This report deals solely with Weirs in the
Mary Valley and has no relevance to our
(34) Summary of how the Government perceives the Traveston as the preferred proposal (35) Principal advisor's letter This is best encapsulated by Mr Paul
Sorensen's letter of the 16th of January 2008 in response to Mr McMah's
further information forwarded in November 2007. Mr Sorensen Dealing with the paragraphs with asterisks:- * JWP Consulting Engineers relates to Mary River water harvesting via weirs in the Mary Valley which is not included in the proposal * Gilbert and associates had excluded the inter dam transfers between the Wivenhoe/Somerset and the Borumba expanded. This left the Mary River water harvesting via Weirs in the Mary Valley which is not included in the proposal. * Marsden Jacobs and Associates completed an economic analysis. The comparison was with the Mary River water harvesting rendering the report valueless. We became aware of the reports and their availability on the Government website in this letter of the 16th January 2008 which is some 12 months after they were first completed. This letter is a response to further information supplied by us in November 2007. Mr McMah had requested that the Hydrology
and Engineering contracts be let to firms that had not previously been engaged
by the Government. The Premier was of the view and supported by the Coordinator
General previous to the current Coordinator General that publication on the web
was sufficient. I have requested from the current Coordinator General the dates
of publication of the reports and any amendments thereto. (36) QWI public comments (Qld Water Infrastructure Pty Ltd) QWI is the Government owned private company
"Queensland Water Infrastructure". It is * "He said that the report (hydrological) did not consider transfer between Wivenhoe/Somerset and the Borumba etc.". We know from the above that the Water Resource (Moreton) Plan 2007 provides for the transfer out and later return of water now lost to the system. An attempt was made eight months later though an added appendix to influence the mechanics of the transfer with the odd statement that the Borumba expanded to 2,000,000ML had to be overflowing before transfers back to the Wivenhoe/Somerset could begin. It was supported by the equally odd statement that the Borumba would be overflowing during the same "uncommon event". At 2,000,000ML the dam is larger than the Burdekin.* The Borumba scheme less reliable. T hey were referring to "uncommon events". They are most likely unaware that these events are the backbone of our water supply in the Wivenhoe/Somerset. A full Borumba dam of 2,000,000ML that can be attained in an "uncommon event" of reasonable size is 28 years supply of the Traveston stage 1 on which he was commenting.* The Engineering assessment is dealt with prior in the Weirs section just above. The $3.1 billion, that the QWI refers to, includes the Weirs which are not in our proposal. With them extracted, the cost of the dam wall is slightly less than $1.4 billion. Add to that our Engineer's ball park assessment of $1/2 billion for the transfer pipes and associated equipment and we have a cost of $1.9 billion to compare with the Traveston all three stages of $3.1 billion and not the $1.6 billion used by the QWI for stage 1 only. However, to be conservative and in the absence of accurate assessments for both projects, I am setting the cost of our proposal at around $2.6 billion using information that the Engineering report applied to pumping from the Mary River which is not in our proposal. We have seen above that the volume of water comparison of both fully completed projects is that the McMah proposal is at least equal to or greater than the Traveston.* They compare the rainfall in the Mary Valley catchment with the Upper Brisbane River![]() and
states that the Mary Valley receives 55% more rainfall. This essentially correct
but the Upper Brisbane River is inland. It is the junior partner to the Stanley
River except in "uncommon events" when its large catchment in tandem
with the Stanley can fill the dams from scratch. The coastal comparison to which they
refer should be the Stanley River catchment. They are sister catchments and the
variation is 6% with almost all of that variation in times of "uncommon
events". The Summer rainfall figures are there for you to judge. I
believe an accurate measurement of the worth of the Traveston could be examined
as follows:-
Both the Stanley and Mary Rivers have their source in the same area of Mt Mee. They are the subject of a paper by a CSIRO geologist who notes that it is a "geological structural anomaly" with both Rivers initially flowing to the Coast and then turning inland and eventually flow out to sea both North and South of their respective source. It leaves the coast line with little interruption of Rivers from Brisbane to the Maryborough Region. With this common geological occurrence and with exactly the same rainfall pattern (picture above) they lead me to believe that the probable action of the Traveston proposal could be judged by examination of the Stanley and the Somerset dam system. To me the primary purpose would be to observe that it could maintain the 70,000ML without "uncommon events" for a 14 year period with normal summer rainfall only with the exclusion of all "uncommon events". Such a period was recent and within the scope of our records being 14 years 1974 to 1988 which was the longest period without an uncommon event since 1841. This comparison of the Mary Valley catchment with the inland Upper Brisbane River is one of the chief justifications in the EIS of the Traveston Dam proposal and is a fundamental flaw. This aspect is
dealt with more fully in the correspondence section (37) More water available from all dams at less cost Our plan for the two way link from the Wivenhoe/Somerset to the expanded Borumba to 2,000,000ML is at least equal to the Traveston proposal all three stages. The additional volume beyond the HYNF calculation in the Wivenhoe/Somerset is considerable and when considered in conjunction with the short extension to the Northern Interconnector, a further large volume of water is available from the overflowing coastal dams. The sum total of these outcomes is the possibility that some or all of the 4 desalination plants costing around $3 billion may not be necessary. There should be sufficient water to account for population growth well into the latter half of this century if the installation of the Traveston stage 3 by 2050 is correct. The additional water when calculated is beyond the Traveston calculation and should take us further into the latter half of the century. The cost estimates using partly the
Engineering report comes in at around $2.6 billion as compared to the Traveston
all three stages at $3.1 billion. (38) Hydrological and Engineering reports rendered ineffectual through lack of definition It is my opinion that the Hydrology and
Engineering reports, on which the Government so heavily relies, have been
rendered ineffectual through lack of clear definition. We have lost altogether
the Engineering and Hydrology reporting on the Wivenhoe/Somerset transfers and in
that regard were assisted by an engineer whose name appears on the Wivenhoe Dam
plaque. (39) Support of Prime Minister's Senior policy advisor We have the support of a
Senior policy advisor to the Prime Minister whom we have kept informed from well
before his election to Governing party. The support is on the basis that we have
asked "An independent review of our material and their material and if
there is something in it then a more detailed review be conducted". He has
pointed out that it is the State Government responsibility but has conveyed his
support to the Minister. (40) Uncommon events the ultimate arbiter of our proposal v Traveston As I have said
previously, uncommon events themselves will be the ultimate arbitrator. The vision
of them overflowing the dams and the water wasted will be powerful in persuading the citizens in
SEQ that storage was the correct answer. Depleted dams can be attributed to any
number of factors and the one selected "worst drought in 100 years"
has a case to answer when the facts are applied. End of index (home) page. Thank you for your patience. All comments welcome. Contact John
Hodgkinson
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