The position at 2005/06
The drop of 18.1% in dam levels to 39.1% at 30/06/05
provided a very tight situation.
The alternatives under a no pressure situation are:-
- Provide
for processed water such as Desalination and Recycled
- Retain
the water now flowing over our dam walls in times of “uncommon events”
and minor flooding (like Hinze of recent times) by diverting it to very
large storage facilities such as the Borumba Dam expanded to 2,000,000ML for
later use.
A comparison of the amount of water provided is (1)
Desalination 45,000ML/a (Tugun) and Recycled 140,000ML/a which may increase with
water usage. The total is 185,000ML/a.
(2) Surplus from Wivenhoe/Somerset identified by Engineers GHD
is 80,000ML/a. and is based on HYNF. Being based on HYNF, there is a significant
increase in this volume that can be determined at a later time. Surplus from the
Borumba’s own resources with the dam expansion is 90,000ML/a. The
total is therefore 170,000ML/a plus a not quantified significant volume.
The decision under a “no pressure”
situation is therefore marginal
There was no alternative under conditions
that existed. The grid was promulgated and you are to be congratulated on
its execution.
Our proposal, we contend, is the obvious
enhancement of the Grid proposition.
Traveston Crossing Dam
proposal
This dam is essentially a
“summer rainfall dam”. Its rainfall pattern (attached) is exactly the 
same
as the
Stanley
River
catchment (
Somerset
) with the
Mary
Valley
shading it by 6% in volume mainly in “uncommon events”. The TCD does not
have the support facilities of the
Stanley
River
which flows via the
Somerset
into the Wivenhoe Dam. All uncommon events fill the TCD and the rest goes over
the top every time.
The difficulty for the Traveston is therefore a HYNF
examination should account for the, at times, very large gaps in the timing of
“uncommon events”. Under a separate exercise “uncommon events” should be
excluded to appreciate a “worst case scenario”. With similar rainfall
patterns in those times, both catchments would be experiencing difficulty at the
same time as we have seen in the Wivenhoe/Somerset.
The SKM/QWI EIS main justification of the TCD was a
comparison of the rainfall with the Upper Brisbane River Catchment which is the
junior partner to the
Stanley
River
providing only 1/3 of our water from the Wivenhoe/Somerset system even though
its catchment is 3 times greater. The
comparison was unrealistic and produced a skewed result. This is detailed in
other documentation in your possession.
The TCD requires the damming of the
Mary
Valley
. Our storage proposal allows the
Mary
River
to run free.
Current
position and decision making process
With the dams currently at 46% and
the grid consisting of Desalination and Recycled Water about to be introduced,
the dams will not fall below 40% for many years, and this is presently the
adopted level for introduction of recycled water.
A return of just one “uncommon event” will fill the
dams. They will stay full, or near full, with summer rain and added desalinated
water. Residents of SEQ will begin to understand that “uncommon events” are
our major source of water and that the Traveston may be irrelevant in
circumstances similar to those that prevailed when the Wolfdene dam was
cancelled. The Wivenhoe was filled by two uncommon events in 1988 and 1989 and
the Goss Government went to the December 1989 election with the Wolfdene
cancellation as part of the platform.
The following “uncommon event” will go
completely over the top as there will be inadequate storage space in the FSL
(Full Supply Level).
In these circumstances, if one holds a strong belief in
Climate Change, which is evident in the flood chart of the BOM 1840 to 2000
(attached rainfall incorporated), the next “event”, if equivalent to 1841, 1844
or 1893, will
flood
Brisbane
to a much greater degree than the 1974 flood. Under our proposal, there would be only one
instance in the last 160 years when the dams would not be ready to provide the
2,150,000 million ML to mitigate the flood. (750,000ML at ½ FSL of the joint
dams and 1,400,000 flood compartments adjusted for dam safety levels). This is
750,000ML more than conditions that would exist in the TCD proposal, being 50%
of the Wivenhoe/Somerset FSL.
Public attention has been heavily focused on
“drought?” conditions. “Uncommon events” will return with the result as
outlined.
Under these conditions, it appears that the
TCD was selected with little or no perceptive thought given to a storage
alternative. However the TCD was included in the original “emergency
legislation” demonstrating the duress of that time. That time has passed as
announced by the Deputy Premier in recent months that “never again will we be
subjected to stringent water restrictions”. We agree with the Deputy
Premier.
As this is 36 years ahead of completion of
the TCD, this will give us time to assess any further water from both
Wivenhoe/Somerset and Borumba above the proven 170,000ML/a. There may be no need
for any of the 4 desalination plants producing 25,000ML each proposed
to be introduced thus saving an estimate of $3.5 billion based on the
cost of the Tugun plant of 45,000ML/a and costing $1.2 billion.
The TCD was selected in a time of extreme
pressure. We now understand from public pronouncements that environmental
difficulties have been experienced at further cost and have caused delay.
This pause provides ample time, without pressure of water shortage, to
re-consider if better results could be achieved.
We think our proposal delivers better results.
It certainly warrants thorough independent review.
Review
of the meeting
There are two aspects of the matters dealt with
which, with respect, should be reviewed.
1. Mechanics of the surplus water available and
2. Water Resource
Plan (Moreton) 2007 No 31 2007
Mechanics
of the surplus water available
Engineering
and costing of the two-way pipeline from Wivenhoe/Somerset to Borumba
The Engineering and costing that I presented in my
EIS response under the alternative section was made available by a Civil
Engineer whose name appears prominently on the Wivenhoe Dam Plaque. All of his
workings are available in my EIS. It was done on the same basis of the JWP
Engineering report, i.e. “if there is
something in it we will investigate further”.
JWP Engineering also presented a range of
options for pumping and piping water from the Weirs in the
Mary
Valley
. We paid little heed to those as our submission had no intention to harvest
water from the
Mary
River
. However, revisiting that report shows that 2 pipes of 1.8M diameter will move
1000ML a day as suits our proposal. The cost
for 31klm is $531m (attached). The distance from Wivenhoe to Borumba is approx
60klm and therefore twice the cost at $1,062m plus pumping, electricity etc. of
$ 217m for a total cost of $1,279m.
The overall cost of our plan based on the JWP Engineering
report is therefore $1,279m being the transfer capital cost plus the dam and
hydro plant at $1,396m = $2,675m. With the worsening financial situation
throughout the World, these figures may now be less.
JWP Supporting evidence is attached.
A pipeline from the Borumba to the Northern
Interconnector is not in our proposal but it makes sense as it would complete a
‘ring road’ style grid and provide great flexibility for water delivery east
of the range through the
Sunshine
Coast
to
Brisbane
. It would appear to be in the region of the northern connector in pipe size
etc. as it would not be moving water quantity required for the
Wivenhoe/Somerset.
Surplus water
in the Wivenhoe/Somerset and pumping requirements
Surplus water
There appears to be no dispute that there is
80,000ML available, on an annualised basis, surplus water in the
Wivenhoe/Somerset system. It is restated for completeness. The operation of the
“Water Resource Plan (Moreton)” is in dispute with regard to “Uncommon
events (floods)” and is examined under a separate section below.
HYNF estimates and the existence of
surplus flood water.
This
80,000ML/a surplus is viewed in the GHD report section 3.15 “Augmentation of
Wivenhoe 
Dam Storage Volume”. It involves consideration of raising the dam
wall. The potential for additional supply (3.15.3) was based on the HYNF
estimates completed by NRM&W in December 2005. The yield table (3.15.2) is
on page 667 and is attached. In addition to the 80,000ML, the HYNF method is
conservative as any further overflow of flood water will not be able to be
retained in the FSL. However, under our proposal, some of it is retrievable and
these calculations follow:-
Page 30 of my EIS shows my estimates for three separate periods
1840 to 1889 – 50 years at a yearly
average of 189,000ML
1891 to 1970 – 80 years at a yearly
average of 65,078ML
1971 to 2001 - 30 years at a yearly average
of 123,930ML.
It is clear than my estimates for 1891 to
1970 are light as the HYNF registered 80,000ML for all periods back to 1890
records.
The 1840 to 1889 period suggests the existence of an
additional 109,000ML (189,000-80,000). Visual aspects of the BOM flood graph
confirm this.
The 1971 to 2001 period suggests the
existence of an additional 43,930ML (123,930-80,000).
Overall assessment of available water from Wivenhoe/Somerset
The GHD report of a surplus of 80,000ML on
an annualised basis is conservative.
Sections of my EIS alternative proposal that
support these conclusions are attached.
Pumping
requirements
The pumping
requirements were laid out in my EIS alternative proposal on pages 27 to 30.
Page 27, which sets out expected flow volumes, and page 30, which sets out
available water and pumping requirements, are attached.
Specific question raised
relating to pumping
The mechanics
of the flood holding and pumping was raised. The question is what happens if,
when a flood is being held, the area
experiences another flood soon after?
The maximum amount of water to be taken out of the flood is
1,524,000ML (attached). This would occur in a major flood of which there
were 5 in the 160 years 1840 to 2000. The Borumba is expected to gain around
500,000ML under the same flood influence with spare capacity of 1,500,000ML.
This requires the use of the flood compartments of the Wivenhoe/Somerset to
750,000ML.
The flood compartments are Wivenhoe
1,450,000ML and Somerset 524,000ML. However dam safety levels reduce the totals
of the two dams to approximately 1,400,000ML . This leave approx 650,000ML
(1,400,000 – 750,000) spare.
Pumping of the 750,000ML flood compartment
water will take just short of 2 years and pumping for one year would make space
available of around 375,000ML.
One year after the flood there is space in
the flood compartments of 1,025,000ML (650,000 + 375,000).
All moderate and minor floods in the 160
years 1840 to 2000 would have been accommodated, or close to having been
accommodated, by the spare capacity of the flood compartment if they followed
the major floods. None did. (attached).
There is one exception to the rule. The
major flood of 1888 was 3.5m and it was followed by a major flood in 1889 of
5.3m. By comparison, the 1974 flood was 5.4m and the mitigation is reduced to
the above 1,025,000ML. This will have some effect on the flood heights of 1974.
However, the TCD proposal would have seen the Wivenhoe/Somerset filled in 1889
from the 1888 flood and the flood compartment empty by then at 1,400,000ML. A
slightly better position of 375,000ML (1,400,000-1,025,000) for this one-off
difficult situation and marginal in these unusual circumstances.
These are elementary calculations made in
the circumstances of no engineering observations available due to the
misdirection of “reports”. We have no doubt that your Department has well
qualified personnel who will be able to come up with improved methods if so
instructed.
Yield
of the Borumba
The understanding from Mr XXXXXX was that
the dam level graph handed to Ron McMah 
(attached) showing a yield of 51,000ML/a
was accurate and based on the flows of the headwaters of Yabba Creek. The graph
commenced in 1890.
All of the above information supports a yield from the Borumba of 82,301ML/a.
Building
for the future
The meeting considered what the attitude of
the people of SEQ might be to the Storage proposal versus the TCD. Aspects that
affect the decision are now set out.
The storage proposal requires expenditure of
$2.6 billion with total completion in 2014. It has available 30,000ML yield in
the Borumba under the prevailing weather conditions as the TCD. It will retain
750,000ML after the first uncommon event is retrieved from the Wivenhoe/Somerset
system in addition to the volume of water collected from that event in its own
catchment.
The TCD requires $1.7 billion for a yield of
70,000ML and stage 2 appears to come in about 10/15 years later supplying
40,000ML. The final dam stage is around 2050 and supplies 40,000ML. The overall
cost is estimated to be $3.1 billion
The circumstances are:-
We are 8 years into a gap in “uncommon
events”. We just missed two with the August 2007 event brushing the Coast and
failing to come on land and the May 2008 event staying out to sea. There are
large gaps of 19, 18 and 14 years in the last 160 years. The average for the 60
years 1841 to 1900 is 3.5 years. For the 50 years
1901 to 1950 the average is 8.3 years.
For the 50 years 1951 to 2000 the average is 3.8 years.
(attached)
With the action of the grid and summer rain
holding the Wivenhoe/Somerset system to not less than 40%, the next “uncommon
event” will fill the Wivenhoe/Somerset system.
If the “uncommon event” arrives before
the present TCD environmental concerns are
met, it will be difficult to progress with a full Wivenhoe/Somerset system, that
being Wolfdene Dam revisited.
If the TCD is commenced before the
“uncommon event”, the fallacy of the cancellation of the Wolfdene dam will
be obvious to all of the people of SEQ as will the fact that
the fundamental error is being repeated in reverse at Traveston Crossing.
A second “uncommon event” will go over
the top putting the planning process in disarray because of denial of and
destruction of the only available large scale storage facility. (the footings of
the TCD proposed dam wall for the Borumba will exclude the future raising
required unless the new wall is built to accommodate expansion to 2,000,000 ML
at a later date, which would seem unlikely as it would raise many questions.).
All of the large gaps between “uncommon
events” of 19, 18 and 14 years mentioned above were preceded by major floods.
This would have filled the 2,000,000 capacity of the Borumba to that level. A
comparison with the TCD stage 1 of 70,000ML annually equates to over 28 years
supply.
Water
Resource (Moreton) Plan 2007 No31,
2007
An overview of the mechanics of our
proposal to observe conformity with the Act
It was necessary to deal with the mechanics
of the proposal in order to see that
The Act provides
Part
3
Section
11 General outcomes
(page 9)
(1) Each of the following is a general outcome for
surface water in the plan
area-
(a) to provide for additional water to be taken from the
plan area for future water entitlements;
PART 10
(pages 57/58)
Section
97 Amending or replacing plan
The
Minister must consider amending this plan or preparing a new plan to replace
this plan if the Minister is satisfied-
(a) in
relation to the outcomes mentioned in part 3-
(i) water entitlements in the plan area are not
sufficient to meet water needs sourced from the plan area having regard to-
(A) the extent to which water is being taken under water
entitlements; and
(B) the efficiency of present, and expected future, water
use; and
(C) emerging requirements for additional water; and
(D) alternative water sources including, for example,
recycled water and water savings from improved efficiency of water use; and
(E) the likely time frame in which additional water will
be required; and
(ii) there are economically viable and ecologically
sustainable uses for additional water; or
(b) the plan is inconsistent with the SEQ regional plan.
It appears clear that our proposal fits
within the Legislation particularly Part 3 (1) and Part 10 (C) and (D) in
particular.
It requires the Minister to observe our
proposal and make a decision.
Any inconsistence, if any exists, with the
SEQ Regional Plan would come under the Minister’s jurisdiction. The Act, as it
is drafted, has anticipated a changing situation.
Perhaps the Moreton
Plan (2007) legislation should be amended and extended (and renamed if
necessary) to include an enlarged Borumba Dam, to facilitate the completion of a
true ring-road style grid to better service SE Queensland.
The dynamics of SEQ including the Moreton Plan (2007) have
changed with the introduction of the Grid. The possibility of this happening is
contained in the Moreton Plan which recognized that it could become outdated
with the frequent reassessment required by the Act.
You are now fully aware that the three
“reports” that issued did not cover the most important aspect of the
Wivenhoe/Somerset to Borumba transfer because of “advice” received by the
Hydrologists that there was no water available from the Wivenhoe/Somerset
System. The result was that it prevented the use of the Borumba as a storage
facility and isolated the water supply to the dam’s own catchment. Any
comparison with the TCD was bound to fail. The cost of building the 2 million ML
dam solely for its own catchment will fail in both cost and water supply.
Various responses from Government sources
have invariably drawn attention to these “reports” as evidence of proper
inquiry into our proposal, and they were
continually used to block any review of our proposal. In the circumstances, we
believe that we are entitled to a prompt response in the following way:-
All of this process can be shortened by
having an independent review of our material and your material on the basis of
“if there is something in it then further detailed review would proceed”.
Conclusion
Again
we thank you for your time and courtesy and look forward to your response.
……………………….
John V Hodgkinson F.C.A.
February 2007. Output from the
Government IQQM computer model, covering the 111 years 1890 to 2000, has proven Mr Drury correct. In essence 300mm of
rain in the catchments in a few days is a flood and, in the right circumstances,
can fill the dams from scratch. On the other hand 3 months of 100mm a month is a
comparative
trickle. These facts can be buried in official overall rainfall statistics the
use of which in dam performance can and did throw up statistical aberrations.
records from 1841 reveal that
they occur on average every 3.7 years with most below that average. Therefore
those above can extend well above that average such as the recent period of 2001
to 2007.
