|
I have been fortunate to be assisted by Mr T. Herse, retired,
of the Gold Coast. I have known Trevor for many years and he made the mistake of
dropping in unexpectedly for a cup of tea early in the piece when I was
examining this situation.
The following response from Mr Reeves MP  Parliamentary
Secretary to the Premier dated 15th August 2008 was in response to a series of
letters to his local member Ms Peta-Kaye Croft MP and the Premier. The response
completes the objections to our proposal from both the Water Commission and the
QWI. The two page letter truncated to one page for convenience is attached.
Mr Herse sent it to me for comment. My comments are in the
following 7 page letter with some attachments. Copies were provided to the
Premier, Coordinator General and the member for Griffith Hon Kevin Rudd MP PM.
The Water resource plan (Moreton) has been adequately dealt
with in the correspondence tab XXXXX. The Water Commission advice as outlined by
Mr Reeves is the subject of my letter.
22nd
August 2008
Mr
T Herse
29 O’Grady Drive
PARADAISE
POINT QLD
4216
Copy to Member for Griffith
Trevor,
Thank
you for a copy of the letter from Mr Reeves MP from the Office of the Premier
concerning the alternatives to the proposed Traveston Crossing Dam.
The
letter was dated the 15th August 2008 and obviously Mr Reeves was not
aware of our clarification submission to the Coordinator General of the 12th
August 2008 dealing with the points raised in response to the Gold Coast
Bulletin “Focus” article. It is relevant to his letter and a copy is
enclosed for forwarding to Mr Reeves.
We
are again fortunate as Mr Reeves has raised specific points which relates to the
operations of our proposal.
The
acceptance of the existence of 80,000ML from the Wivenhoe and 91,000ML from the
Borumba expanded to 2,000,000ML is now not subject to challenge from either Mr
Reeves or the QWI. Mr Reeves’s letter has now reverted to the operation level
for the first time. This means that 171,000ML is available at a cost of $1.9
billion as compared to the Traveston, all three stages, of 150,000ML at a cost
of $3.1 billion. Our proposal would be up and running without stage requirements
whereas stage three of the Traveston is of an ephemeral nature.
Mr
Reeves points raised are all contained in the last paragraph on page 1. They
are:-
“as
opposed to the 446,900ML/annum claimed by Mr Hodgkinson”
This
is not my claim. It is contained in the SEQWater Environment report of year
2001. (Att 16). SEQWater was formed around 1999 as a Corporation to manage the
Dams and Environment of the Dams. They determined the allocations on the basis
of their 446,900ML/annum assessment.
Page 2 of 7
The
Chairman of the Board of Directors of SEQWater Corporation was Mr Bob Grice, a
well known Chartered Accountant, with a recognizable Board of Directors.
Reading
of their annual reports for the last 6 years leaves me with the impression that
they were indeed a professional outfit. The main product that they had to sell
and manage was water. It is elementary that they would know how much of the
water product was available for sale and allocation. They did not pluck that
figure out of the air.
All
of the material that I have used in my submission is based on official
documented information. There are no unsupported assertions and sweeping
statements as we have been placed in a position to prove our case.
The only conclusion that I can draw from Mr Reeve’s remarks is that he
is mistaken or wrongly advised.
“Naturally,
the no failure yield figures are being revised to take into account the
recent drought and these yields are likely
to produce a lower figure again”
The
so called “worst drought in 100 years”, as far as much of South East
Queensland is concerned, was nothing more than a statistical aberration and it
was used repeatedly to explain the depleted state of our Brisbane
Dams. SEQWater has publicly pointed out that there are two types of
rainfall that create inflow into the Dams. They are Summer Rainfall and
“uncommon events” which can fill the dams in a few days. Bureau of
Meteorology rainfall figures for the 6 years to 2007 clearly show that the
summer rainfall was comparable to the long term average. (Att 4, 5 & 6).
What was missing was the “uncommon events” which had gone on their quite
natural walkabout, the previous gap being 14 years from 1974 to 1988.
A
review of the 20th Century (Att 15) shows that only a few mm
separated 8 six year spans without “uncommon events”. Therefore 48 years of
the 20th Century should have been in the lowest category but that is
not how deciles work. It was a misguided but successful
misrepresentation of the position to use a decile map when a
“percentage map” that I had prepared by
the BOM showed 80% of the long term average for the six year period 2002 to
2006. This map confirmed the BOM email (Att 7) that the catchments had received
close to 80% of the long term average and that was in the category of “lowest
on record”. It follows that there has never been less than close to 80% of
that average. Use of a percentage map would have provided an accurate and
clearly visible presentation of the situation and shown
that a “drought” did not exist in the catchments.
Using
the best possible light, the Hydrologists did not understand the problem and
this is reinforced by the undeniable certainty that we were depending on
“uncommon events” to fill the Wivenhoe, and they refilled it four more times
(Att 8). Dam failure was at hand for most of the 20 years of the Wivenhoe Dam.
With the Dam full in February 2001 and a 22.2% drop in 2002, it apparently took
them until year 2005 to realise that there was a problem.
“The Historical no failure (HYNF) yield of
the Wivenhoe Dam has been assessed as between 370,000ML per annum and 390,000ML
per annum as opposed etc”
That
information appears to be out of date. The interim SEQRWSS published in June
2006 had modelled the HYNF joint Wivenhoe/Somerset dam levels at 10% in June
2006. (Att 12). The actual dam levels supplied by SEQWater dam level graph (Att
13 & 14) was 30% for the Wivenhoe and 33% for the
Somerset
at that date. That amounts to
an error of almost 2 years water supply at current restriction levels
using that model.
My
reading of the current situation is that the Water Commission has distanced
itself from the HYNF method and adopted a “stochastic” approach. While
“stochastic” is defined (
Oxford
) as (1). Determined
Page 3 of 7
by a random distribution of probabilities. (2) (of a process) characterized by a
sequence of random variables. (3) governed by the laws of probability, the
Cynics reduce this approach to “best guess under the circumstances”.
Relevance
(Water Resource Plan (Moreton)
All
of the above have relevance to the Water Resource plan (Moreton) which has been
adequately dealt with in the enclosed letter to the Coordinator General. I will
not re-state the details here. The dynamics
have changed and additional allocations have been allowed for from that area
(floating desalination plants; Toowoomba
pipeline) with the introduction of the Grid ex the proposed TCD.
Your question relating to this issue was not addressed by Mr. Reeves in
his answer on behalf of the Premier.
In
addition to the above the Commission has provided for Mr Reeves a one paragraph
assessment of our proposal.
 | Not
able to supply water with sufficient certainty.
|
| Would
be relatively inefficient due to peak water pumping requirements and
evaporation.
|
| Would
be costly.
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| Does
not warrant further investigation
|
Supply
water with sufficient certainty
The
enclosed letter to the Coordinator General and
attachments not only deals with this certainty, it deals with both the TCD and
our proposal over the longest stretch of the last 170 years without an
“uncommon event” being 19 years. (Att 10 & 11). The TCD stage 1 fails
many times using the information of environmental scientist Dr Peter Wylie (Att
27 & 28) whereas our proposal handles that time span.
Would
be relatively inefficient due to peak water pumping requirements and evaporation.
As
with the QWI, there is no denial of the existence of the 80,000ML available on
an annualised basis from the Wivenhoe/Somerset calculated from the GHD report.
The
other major piece of information that came from the GHD report was the possible
alteration of the Wivenhoe Dam full supply
level upwards and a consequential reduction in the flood compartment. This was
discarded for flooding reasons below the dam. However it did tell me that the
water could be maintained for a reasonable period for pumping subject to the
timing of the next flood. This occurred only once in the 170 years being
April 1988 and April 1989. Those two filled the dam to overflow and apparently
caused the misguided advice that our water future was guaranteed. It led to the
immediate cancellation of the Wolfdene Dam.
With
good management, water can be transferred from the Wivenhoe/Somerset to the
Borumba expanded to 2,000,000ML well before full supply level is reached
creating space for the next event. When the flood compartment, now reduced by
dam safety to EL74m, is added, there is room for a reasonable size event and
time to pump it. Should the Wivenhoe
level drop below a predetermined prudent level, water from the Borumba can be
returned to maintain the desired level, which, along with providing a flooding
safeguard for downstream Brisbane River in times of extra heavy rainfall
associated with uncommon events, is the whole purpose of the exercise.
Page 4 of 7
Estimates
of water available, pumping requirements and engineering of the pipeline are
contained on pages 30 to 41 of my EIS submission under the “alternatives”
section. The Engineering probabilities of the pipeline and running costs were
provided by a senior civil Engineer associated with the building of the Wivenhoe
Dam.
It
is difficult to see where evaporation comes into the picture. Perhaps they are
using Ron McMah’s initial transfer arrangements for releases up-river of
Kilcoy and allowing the water to flow downstream to the Wivenhoe. This is not
the intention of the proposal. It is to be truly part of the Grid with two-way
transfer similar to that very recently described on TV by the Premier between
the Hinze Dam and Wivenhoe at the completion of pipeline ceremony, partly
utilizing a hydro-electric plant. The Borumba’s distance from the Wivenhoe is
60klms compared to the Tugun Desalination plant of 100klms with similar
elevations required.
Would
be costly
The
cost of the Dam and Pipeline are in the attached letter
and attachments to the Coordinator General. The cost of TCD, all three
stages including associated roads and highway
relocation, far exceeds the cost of our proposal.
The running costs have been calculated by the Engineer at household rates with
no allowance for the Hydro Power or wholesale rates.
Does
not warrant further investigation
The
advice handed to Mr Reeves by the Queensland Water Commission is in the form of
a one page statement which once again contains sweeping statements and
unsupported assertions.
I
say “once again” as the
Queensland Water Commission offered similar advice to Mr Sorensen in his letter
to Mr Ron McMah dated the 16th January 2008. Mr Sorensen was the
newly appointed Principal Advisor to Minister Lucas. His Reference is:
TN123306/2007-0143. In his letter he offered as a contact point the same
gentleman from the Commission who met Ron McMah at the Borumba Dam and gave him
20 minutes to read and sign the terms of reference of his proposal. Mr McMah’s
reaction is outlined in his response of the 3rd February 2008 which
will be held on Mr Sorensen’s file (Mr McMah’s response is attached to this
letter). Also attached to the letter to Mr Sorensen was an 11 page letter
outlining the flaws in that “advice” offered to Mr Sorensen by the
Commission. It was line listed and detailed.
I
felt the matter was serious and I sent a full copy to the Prime Minister’s
Office. They requested an electronic copy for The Water and Climate Change
Minister Senator Penny Wong. Senator Wong has responded and advised that that
information would be included for consideration as she is required to make
comment on matters affecting her portfolio to Senator Garrett as part of the
approval process.
Our request
The
opportunity to have the inter-basin transfer independently assessed was
destroyed when Mr McMah was presented with a yield statement of the Borumba
expanded to 1,000,000ML showing a yield of only 51,000ML.
As that was not consistent with his proposal he
refused to sign the terms of reference and, as a consequence, the Costing,
Engineering and Hydrology reports were almost entirely directed to Weirs in the
Mary
Valley
. Ron had withdrawn that idea and it was not part of our proposal. The
subsequent review was misdirected. The current TCD stage 2 proposal elevates
that wall only to a 350,000ML dam
Page 5 of 7
supplying
an extra 40,000ML on top of the current 32,000ML .
The
(now) Premier made a promise to “do it if it stacked up” to Mr. McMah at a
Gympie public meeting. The “enquiry” into the matter clearly did not
consider inter-basin transfers between Wivenhoe and Borumba as proposed by Mr.
McMah. That is clearly stated by the
Gilbert & Associates report as pointed out by Mr. Reeves in his letter,
based on limitations imposed by the Water Resource (Moreton) Plan 2006. Although
your question about it has not been answered, the dynamics of that region have
changed with the introduction of the Grid. This is apparent with the allocation
to Toowoomba, the floating desalination proposal and Minister Lucas statement
that “we will never again have severe water restrictions”. That reason not
to analyse inter-basin transfers at that time is no longer, if it ever was, a
realistic impediment to independently reviewing our
proposal.
Independence
All
of the Departments mentioned have a job to do and as a consequence, in my
opinion, are not in a position to do a “without fear or favour” review. The
Queensland Water Commission has excluded itself for reasons outlined above. We
have always said that we will accept an independent review and that has
been our request. In view of past performance, we believe that the residents of
SEQ are entitled to it.
Summary
of the position to date
Uncommon
events
There is
no doubt that “uncommon events” are an integral part of our water supply and
the evidence points strongly towards the fact that their character is not
clearly understood. The main points supporting this are listed:-
| Cancellation
of the Wolfdene Dam.
There were no “uncommon events” between the flood of 1974 and 1988. The
Wivenhoe dam was built to collect further water from the
Stanley
River
which currently supplies 2/3 of the water collected in the system with the
remainder coming from the
Upper
Brisbane
River
. A flood mitigation capacity was added to avoid a repeat of 1974. They were
also aware that without uncommon events a further dam was needed. An unusual
occurrence of two uncommon events in April 1988 and April 1989 filled the
dams almost from scratch to overflow. With most of the land purchased, the
dam was cancelled in December 1989.
|
| Permitting
SEQ to live with dam failure
in the Wivenhoe which was obvious from as far back as 1992. The dam level
graphs clearly indicate this to all in possession of the facts that this is
so.
|
| Unintentional
misrepresentation of the
reason for the depleted state of our dams. Bureau
of Meteorology rainfall figures clearly show that the summer rainfall had
been quite normal and inadequate for our basic needs since 1992. The use of
a decile map, which has the ability to disguise the underlying situation in
certain circumstances, was the basis of “the worst drought in 100
years”. BOM figures show that 48 years of the 20th Century, in
six year segments were in the same category of “lowest on record” but
that is not the way that deciles work.
|
| Error
in the HYNF assessment of the Wivenhoe/Somerset system.
The graph showed a discrepancy of almost 2 year’s water supply when
compared with the actual dam levels supplied by SEQWater.
|
Page 6 of 7
| The
change in basis of assessment to a stochastic approach.
There can be no reasonable guarantees of
the accuracy of the outcome of “stochastic assessments”.
|
| Disagreement
with the accuracy of SEQWater’s assessment of the Wivenhoe/Somerset yield.
The Board of Directors of
SEQWater are very competent people. The Moreton Water Resource plan was
drawn up in times of the non-existent “worst drought on record” and
should be reexamined particularly in light of the changed Dynamics of the
System.
|
| The
Comparison with the Federation Drought.
This report of January 2007 was qualified as to rainfall as hydrological
assessment was not available. While both periods experienced similar overall
rainfall in the catchments at 80% of the long term average, the
“Federation” period did not receive the normal 50% of summer rainfall.
The rainfall was spread out over the whole of the year with little prospect
of inflow. On the other hand the six years to January 2007 received the
normal summer rainfall which created
significant inflows. For example year 2004 when, without restrictions, the
dam level drop was only 2.2%.
|
| The
SKM and QWI report that justifies the TCD on a flawed basis. This
1500 page report sought to justify the Traveston Crossing Dam on page 1 and
2 principally by comparing the “Wivenhoe” and its
Upper
Brisbane
River
catchment with the
Mary
River
and its catchment. That was 55% more rainfall to the
Mary
River
catchment. The correct comparison should have been the TCD ex the Borumba
catchment with the Somerset and its catchment the Stanley River. The
result was slightly less than 10% and reduced to 6% on summer rainfall. The
Stanley
River
provides 2/3 of our water. I have dealt with this aspect in the attached
documentation. There are many other flawed comparisons including: “worst
drought in 100 years”; Comparison with the Federation drought; Booming
population when it was strong but steady, predicted and predictable; use of
the inland deficiency decile map of the Wivenhoe catchment.
|
Available
water
There now appears no denial that 80,000ML surplus does exist in the
Wivenhoe/Somerset system. Mr Reeves’s letter confirms this as they have
considered the operation aspects of our alternative plan.
Mr Newton
of the QWI also appears to accept that there is 91,000ML available from the
Borumba Dam from its own resources. This is confirmed by the expectation of an
additional 40,000ML being extracted by the TCD for a dam of 350,000ML in
capacity.
The net situation of this is that 171,000ML is available up-front as compared to
the TCD all three stages of 150,000ML. The Cost of our proposal calculates to
slightly less than $1.9 billion for the complete system. The TCD all three
stages calculate to $3.1 billion when the alteration to the main highway and
access roads are taken into account.
Water
Resource Plan (Moreton)
This
aspect has been dealt with at length in this letter and attachments. Quite
clearly the plan needs to be re-examined on the basis of the changed Dynamics
and circumstances in which it was drawn up.
Operational
: Pipeline, Pumping requirements and costs
This
aspect is adequately dealt with in my submission as an alternative to the TCD.
It is contained on pages 27 to 42.
Page 7 of 7
The required pipeline, the estimated cost and electricity required are all set
out by a senior Civil Engineer connected to the construction of the Wivehoe Dam.
The electricity has been calculated at household rates and no allowance for the
Hydro Plant at the Borumba Dam expanded to 2,000,000ML.
Engineers JWP provided some details in their report on a construction of a dam
wall at the same focal point. Their estimates were based on a dam to 1,650,000ML
to be constructed in three stages.
Climate
change
With the addition of the Borumba expanded to 2,000,000ML, being almost twice the
size of the Wivenhoe, there is ample capacity to accommodate the wild swings
predicted. The Traveston proposal has no such ability. In the face of these wild
swings the Traveston Dam stage 1 will repeatedly fail using the observations of
Dr Peter Wylie, Environmental Scientist as outlined in the attached documents.
Regards
……………………
John
V Hodgkinson F.C.A.
| 
February 2007. Output from the
Government IQQM computer model, covering the 111 years 1890 to 2000, has proven Mr Drury correct. In essence 300mm of
rain in the catchments in a few days is a flood and, in the right circumstances,
can fill the dams from scratch. On the other hand 3 months of 100mm a month is a
comparative
trickle. These facts can be buried in official overall rainfall statistics the
use of which in dam performance can and did throw up statistical aberrations.
records from 1841 reveal that
they occur on average every 3.7 years with most below that average. Therefore
those above can extend well above that average such as the recent period of 2001
to 2007.
