AN OBSERVATION OF THE CONFLUENCE OF STATISTICAL ABERRATIONS, DAM RATIOS, TIMING AND UNCOMMON RAINFALL EVENTS THAT COMBINED TO HAVE OUR LEADERS DRAW INCORRECT CONCLUSIONS. THEIR INFLUENCE ON ACTIONS TAKEN.

Author : J. V. Hodgkinson F. C. A. Chartered Accountant : August 2006 to May 2010    

The relationship of the Wivenhoe/Somerset dam system to its rainfall in the catchments has been quite different from the way it has been presented to us since the joint dams’ inception in 1986. The main rainfall supplying our water is the, season ignoring, rain depressions in the form of Cyclones, Monsoons and large scale rain depressions. They generally cover the whole of South East Queensland at the same time. They provide much more water than our December to March “wet season” which is well known to us.

Mr Rob Drury of SEQWater drew our attention to this in his Courier Mail article of the 10th February 2007. Output from the Government IQQM computer model, covering the 111 years 1890 to 2000, has proven Mr Drury correct. In essence 300mm of rain in the catchments in a few days is a flood and, in the right circumstances, can fill the dams from scratch. On the other hand 3 months of 100mm a month is a comparative trickle. These facts can be buried in official overall rainfall statistics the use of which in dam performance can and did throw up statistical aberrations.

Mr Drury called these rainfall events “uncommon events”. Bureau of Meteorology flood records from 1841 reveal that they occur on average every 3.7 years with most below that average. Therefore those above can extend well above that average such as the recent period of 2001 to 2007.

Mr Drury also provided dam level charts which were not published by the Courier Mail. They provided clear evidence of the importance of "uncommon events" and the inability of the "Summer wet season" to provide sufficient water from as far back as 1992. We will examine them.

This is my review based on official statistics and documents. These statistics and documents are presented to you so that you can arrive at your own conclusions.

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August 2009

Recent responses from Ministers Hinchcliffe and Robertson have not included reference to these reports. They have simplified their position with these items excluded. They seem to be no longer relevant. 

Index : If you click on a document to examine it remember the number of the paragraph. Depending on how your computer is set-up, it may not return you directly to the picture you were examining. When you click the back button to return, it will bring you back to this page. Click on the page numbered underlined index section that you were examining to return directly to it:-

                The use of the Hydrology and Engineering reports by all sections of Government and our evidence of the lack of precise and agreed "terms of reference", usual in such reports, which negated the important aspects of those reports.  

         23. Main components for examination
            24. Terms of reference for examination of the McMah proposal 
         25. Premier Bligh's comments on the Terms of reference in January 2007
            26. Report completion dates for Engineering and Hydrology 
25. & 26. Premier Bligh negotiation with Mr McMah on terms of reference. Both the Premier and  Mr McMah were ignored with the contracts let and completed while their negotiations were continuing
         27. Terms of reference set aside for the exercise and comparison made 
 27. The Terms of reference were never agreed. The QWC proceeded on the basis of comparison of all three stages of the Traveston although the Government advertised that stage 3 was ephemeral.  This challenge is taken up and the Traveston all  stages is proven inferior. Lack of precision also had adverse results for those reports.       
          28. Elimination of the Wivehoe/Somerset from both those January 2007       reports. 
           29.  The Water Resource (Moreton) Plan 2007 Act provides 
The Water Resource plan  provides for extraction of these flood water and later return. Ordinarily they would have been correct as the system is protected to avoid stress from extraction (28).
            30. Hydrology report amended 8 months after completion
In my view, the amendment of the report by the addition of "Appendix A" came after realisation that the initial exclusion of the Wivenhoe/Somerset was inaccurate after we published material that it was flood water from "uncommon events" that we were centring upon. The Hydrology report appears to have been amended. The amendment was on mechanical grounds with, in my view, incorrect assumptions finally negating the whole of the report and with it the Engineering report.
            31. Amended Hydrology report - Three points we agree and disagree on. 
(1) That "uncommon events" or as they describe them "major meteorological events" generally covered all of South East Qld at the same time: : Agreed
(2) and (3) Disagree : They assume that the expanded Borumba and the Wivenhoe/Somerset would be overflowing at the same time. The Wivenhoe/Somerset overflow regularly as witnessed by the dam level graph. With Frequency of "uncommon events" showing them occurring every 3.7 years on average, and with the Borumba at almost twice the size of the Wivenhoe it would not be necessary to have the Traveston or any other desalination plants as a full Borumba dam has 28 years supply of Traveston stage 1 and 13 years supply of all three stages. The Borumba with its catchment Yabba Creek, will most likely be 1/4 full after each event with 3/4 available for storage of the Wivenhoe/Somerset surplus flood water. The exceptions would be the 1841 and 1893 floods both being 8.5 metres at Brisbane city with the 1974 flood recording 5.4 metres as a comparison.

          32. Weirs in the Mary Valley   
          33. Financial and Economic report - Marsden Jacobs
            34. Summary of how the Government perceives the Traveston as the preferred proposal
            35. Principal advisor's letter 
            36. QWI public comments (Qld Water Infrastructure Pty Ltd)
  The QWI is responsible for building the Traveston Dam and also reviewing our alternative proposal. We managed to have them publicly respond to our proposal   

    Conclusion
          37. More water available from all dams at less cost
            38. Hydrological and Engineering reports rendered ineffectual through lack of definition of our proposal for the contractors in the Terms of Reference and Appendix "A" 
            39  Support of Prime Minister's Senior policy advisor
            40. Uncommon events the ultimate arbiter of our proposal v Traveston

The use of the Hydrology and Engineering reports by all sections of Government and our evidence of the lack of precise and agreed "terms of reference", usual in such reports, which negated the important aspects of those reports.

In this section we will see the evidence of the way we view  events unfolding to render the Hydrology and Engineering reports' ineffectual and the survival and ascendency of the McMah proposal over the Traveston proposal. We will supply the evidence on which this view is based so that you may arrive at your  own conclusion:-

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Ignoring the imperative to have the Terms Of Reference agreed and proceeding with the issue of contracts without the knowledge of the Premier. The Premier and Mr McMah were still negotiating the terms of reference even after the completion of the reports.

Excluding at the outset the all important Wivenhoe/Somerset contribution thus placing the reliance squarely on the yield from the Borumba and bringing in the backup of any shortfall being the inclusion of Weirs in the Mary Valley.

Provide an addendum to the Hydrology report 8 months after it was completed in an abortive attempt to counter, on mechanical grounds, the realisation that the Wivenhoe/Somerset water was flood water and was within the provision of the Act which controls the Moreton Region in which the dams reside. The realisation was prompted by letters to the Premier and the appearance of this website well before the date appearing on the report.

Deny the yield of the Borumba by handing Mr McMah a yield for a dam 1/2 the size intended and further, dispute Engineers GHD assessment of the yield based on a study done specifically for the assessment by their own DNRW (Department of Natural Resources and Water)

Include Weirs in the Mary Valley as the principal component when Mr McMah had placed that aspect as backup only. The subsequent inclusion of the Wivenhoe/Somerset contribution excluded this backup as not necessary. This provision was ignored and added an enormous headline cost and little gain in water supply.

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"Terms of reference (ToR)"  are documents that clearly show what is intended and in this case the McMah plan subject to the Premier's guarantee. Hydrology and Engineering consulting firms were required and would proceed on the basis of the ToR. With two parties involved, agreement of the terms is necessary before the consulting instructions are issued. 

A meeting of officers of the Queensland Water Commission (QWC) and Ron McMah took place on the 27/11/2006 at the Borumba Dam site. He was handed the Terms of Reference (ToR) as the QWC saw his plan together with a yield statement of the Borumba dam for a dam of 1,000,000ML instead of his plan for a dam of 2,000,000ML (first picture). 

He also recognized that the ToR was for all three stages of the Traveston whereas his plan was for stages 1 and 2 with stage 3 regarded as ephemeral even by Premier Beattie on behalf of the Government (second picture). With a deadline of 20 minutes imposed by the officers, he firmly rejected it.

Both the Hydrology and Engineering reports, which require 4 to 6 weeks to prepare, were completed by the 22nd January 2007. The consultancies had been issued sometime in December 2006 with the QWC Terms Of Reference without agreement by Mr McMah. ( refer report completion dates below). The lack of precision of what was intended had a significant effect on the worth of these reports. ( I have requested the exact dates from the Coordinator General ).

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15th January 2007 (undated but close to ) " I am very keen to expedite the analysis of the proposal as a genuine alternative to the Traveston Crossing Dam, however I am reluctant to expend public funds without having your endorsement of terms of reference"

19th January 2007 "You will appreciate, the assessment of your proposal can only occur when we have a clear and shared understanding of what is to be assessed".

31st January 2007 " I am sure that there are a number of people who heard your proposal at the Gympie meeting are anxious for it to be genuinely analysed" . I urge you to meet with officers of the Department to resolve this matter as soon as possible".

All of these letters were written while the Hydrology and Engineering reports well under way or completed on the 22nd January 2007.

There was further correspondence between the Premier and Ron McMah with correspondence by the Premier on the 9th February 2007 and a response by Ron McMah on the 15th February 2007.

JWP Engineering report was signed off for release on the 22nd January 2007. It also acknowledged that the Hydrology report was also complete. (E1)

Confirmation of the dates on which the contracts of Hydrology and Engineering were let has been requested of the Coordinator General.

There was an undertaking by the State Government to publish these reports. The Engineering report was dated the 22nd January 2007, the Hydrology report the 17th September 2007 and the Marsden Jacob Financial report the 7th September 2007. The Marsden Jacob reports deals with Weirs in the Mary Valley which are excluded from this proposal. I have written to the Coordinator General for the dates of publication. We first became aware of them on the 16th January 2008.

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Let us set aside for the moment Terms Of Reference and for the exercise compare the McMah plan with all three stages of the Traveston both in water supply, cost and delivery.

Let us see how this important volume of water was dealt with.

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Both the JWP Engineering and Gilbert and Associates hydrology reports eliminated this inter-dam transfer system in their "Executive Summary" Reports. Bear in mind we are not aware of any precise Terms of reference issued to these firms nor the "advice" offered.

1. The water involved (80,000 Megalitres plus) was in excess of the current capture and yield of the Wivenhoe/Somerset and

2. That the Water Resource (Moreton) Plan 2007, gazetted on the 16th March 2007 some two months after their reports, specifically provides for the extraction and later return of those waters.
   
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It appears that the realisation of the above came to the Hydrologists and obviously the QWC when Ron McMah's letter to the Premier dated the 10th September 2007 and

referring to his letter of the 20th August 2007 requesting a meeting with the Premier to assess new data. 

This new data was flood water from the Wivenhoe/Somerset and Borumba expanded to 2,000,000ML as previously outlined. It was first published in this website in early August 2007. The Hydrology report appears to have been amended principally with "Appendix A". Instead of a January 2007 date which the Engineering report still bears, it was dated 17th September 2007 eight months after its first completion date.

The report still bore the denial of any examination of the system as expressed in detail above with no changes as illustrated above. However I take it that Appendix A was in recognition that surplus water was a serious threat to the survival of the Traveston.

"Appendix A" is a review of the system of how the transfers between the Wivenhoe/Somerset and Borumba dams would work. Some very strange assumptions and presumptions were made that seemed to indicate the author was not fully briefed and they are discussed below. Mr McMah had no knowledge of either both reports and the amendment until the 16th January 2008.

A request has been made to the Coordinator General for confirmation of these dates and advice on the circumstances surrounding this apparent alteration.

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The Borumba catchment is relatively small (approximately 465 sq km) for a dam required under stage 3 McMah proposal (between 1,500GL and 2,000GL (2,000.000ML) and as such is likely to fill and spill due to the influence of large scale meteorological influences which almost always influence the Brisbane River catchment at the same time. As such Borumba is likely to be overflowing generally during those times in which Wivenhoe & Somerset are close to Full Supply Level."

I agree with the blue content of the statement. "Uncommon events" as SEQWater describes them, generally cover all of South East Queensland at the same time.

With regard to the red statement, as we have seen, "uncommon events" occur on average every 3.7 years and in any case sufficient for 28 years supply from Traveston stage 1 and 13 years supply for all three stages of the proposed Traveston Dam. On that basis there would be no need for any stages of the Traveston.

Unfortunately it is not true. We are discussing a dam of 2,000,000ML which is larger than the Burdekin. They agree that the Borumba has a limited but efficient catchment. The only times that this would occur is in an 1893 or 1841 type flood. They were 8.5 metres as compared with the 1974 of 5.4 metres which based on stream flows would not have filled the 2,000,000ML dam.

The purple statement is not correct. The most likely result is a fill of around 500,000ML or 1/4 of capacity of 2,000,000ML. The spare capacity is the used by the Wivenhoe/Somerset and any other dam connected to the system.

The Wivenhoe/Somerset, or any other dam in the system, under considered management can deliver water to the Borumba at any time. The reverse is also true.

The two page "appendix A" can be viewed in full with line numbers and comments by me at the Qld Govt Reports tab

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This aspect was a backup procedure to be utilised if the original plan was inadequate. It was later withdrawn in writing by Mr McMah.

Its necessity dissolved with the amount of surplus flood water in the Wivenhoe/Somerset system. In considering costs, that very costly aspect is always added to our costs by Government agencies when responding to enquiries.

This report deals solely with Weirs in the Mary Valley and has no relevance to our proposal. It is added for completeness. It is interesting to note the date being the 7th September 2007 which is close to the Hydrology report completed by the 22nd January 2007 but bearing the date of the 17th September 2007

This is best encapsulated by Mr Paul Sorensen's letter of the 16th of January 2008 in response to Mr McMah's further information forwarded in November 2007. Mr Sorensen was the principal advisor to the the Minister for planning and infrastructure Hon P. Lucas M.P.

Dealing with the paragraphs with asterisks:-

* JWP Consulting Engineers relates to Mary River water harvesting via weirs in the Mary Valley which is not included in the proposal

* Gilbert and associates had excluded the inter dam transfers between the Wivenhoe/Somerset and the Borumba expanded. This left the Mary River water harvesting via Weirs in the Mary Valley which is not included in the proposal.

* Marsden Jacobs and Associates completed an economic analysis. The comparison was with the Mary River water harvesting rendering the report valueless.

We became aware of the reports and their availability on the Government website in this letter of the 16th January 2008 which is some 12 months after they were first completed. This letter is a response to further information supplied by us in November 2007.

Mr McMah had requested that the Hydrology and Engineering contracts be let to firms that had not previously been engaged by the Government. The Premier was of the view and supported by the Coordinator General previous to the current Coordinator General that publication on the web was sufficient. I have requested from the current Coordinator General the dates of publication of the reports and any amendments thereto.

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QWI is the Government owned private company "Queensland Water Infrastructure". It is responsible for building the Traveston Dam as well as initially assessing proposals lodged under the alternatives section of the EIS (Environmental Impact Assessment). It was forced into a public response on the appearance of a "Focus" article that appeared in the Gold Coast Bulletin. They are added for review with the response now examined:-

* "He said that the report (hydrological) did not consider transfer between Wivenhoe/Somerset and the Borumba etc.". We know from the above that the Water Resource (Moreton) Plan 2007 provides for the transfer out and later return of water now lost to the system. An attempt was made eight months later though an added appendix to influence the mechanics of the transfer with the odd statement that the Borumba expanded to 2,000,000ML had to be overflowing before transfers back to the Wivenhoe/Somerset could begin. It was supported by the equally odd statement that the Borumba would be overflowing during the same "uncommon event". At 2,000,000ML the dam is larger than the Burdekin.

* The Borumba scheme less reliable. They were referring to "uncommon events". They are most likely unaware that these events are the backbone of our water supply in the Wivenhoe/Somerset. A full Borumba dam of 2,000,000ML that can be attained in an "uncommon event" of reasonable size is 28 years supply of the Traveston stage 1 on which he was commenting.

* The Engineering assessment is dealt with prior in the Weirs section just above. The $3.1 billion, that the QWI refers to, includes the Weirs which are not in our proposal. With them extracted, the cost of the dam wall is slightly less than $1.4 billion. Add to that our Engineer's ball park assessment of $1/2 billion for the transfer pipes and associated equipment and we have a cost of $1.9 billion to compare with the Traveston all three stages of $3.1 billion and not the $1.6 billion used by the QWI for stage 1 only. 

However, to be conservative and in the absence of accurate assessments for both projects, I am setting the cost of our proposal at around $2.6 billion using information that the Engineering report applied to pumping from the Mary River which is not in our proposal. We have seen above that the volume of water comparison of both fully completed projects is that the McMah proposal is at least equal to or greater than the Traveston.

* They compare the rainfall in the Mary Valley catchment with the Upper Brisbane River and states that the Mary Valley receives 55% more rainfall. This essentially correct but the Upper Brisbane River is inland. It is the junior partner to the Stanley River except in "uncommon events" when its large catchment in tandem with the Stanley can fill the dams from scratch. 

The coastal comparison to which they refer should be the Stanley River catchment. They are sister catchments and the variation is 6% with almost all of that variation in times of "uncommon events". The Summer rainfall figures are there for you to judge. I believe an accurate measurement of the worth of the Traveston could be examined as follows:- 

Both the Stanley and Mary Rivers have their source in the same area of Mt Mee. They are the subject of a paper by a CSIRO geologist who notes that it is a "geological structural anomaly" with both Rivers initially flowing to the Coast and then turning inland and eventually flow out to sea both North and South of their respective source. It leaves the coast line with little interruption of Rivers from Brisbane to the Maryborough Region. 

With this common geological occurrence and with exactly the same rainfall pattern (picture above) they lead me to believe that the probable action of the Traveston proposal could be judged by examination of the Stanley and the Somerset dam system. To me the primary purpose would be to observe that it could maintain the 70,000 Megalitres without "uncommon events" for a 14 year period with normal summer rainfall only with the exclusion of all "uncommon events". 

Such a period was recent and within the scope of our records being 14 years 1974 to 1988 which was the longest period without an uncommon event since 1841. The 4 monthly summer rainfall averages for that period were 476mm for the Somerset and 492mm for the proposed Mary Valley catchment. When viewing the chart, bear in mind that "uncommon events" do not pay any attention to the time of year. The 1988 and 1989 events both occurred in April being outside the scope of the graph and they broke this 14 year gap. 

This comparison of the Mary Valley catchment with the inland Upper Brisbane River is one of the chief justifications in the EIS of the Traveston Dam proposal and is a fundamental flaw.

This aspect is dealt with more fully in the correspondence section

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Our plan for the two way link from the Wivenhoe/Somerset to the expanded Borumba to 2,000,000 Megalitres is at least equal to the Traveston proposal all three stages. The additional volume beyond the HYNF calculation in the Wivenhoe/Somerset is considerable and when considered in conjunction with the short extension to the Northern Interconnector, a further large volume of water is available from the overflowing coastal dams.

The sum total of these outcomes is the possibility that some or all of the 4 desalination plants costing around $3 billion may not be necessary. There should be sufficient water to account for population growth well into the latter half of this century if the installation of the Traveston stage 3 by 2050 is correct. The additional water when calculated is beyond the Traveston calculation and should take us further into the latter half of the century.

The cost estimates using partly the Engineering report comes in at around $2.6 billion as compared to the Traveston all three stages at $3.1 billion.

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It is my opinion that the Hydrology and Engineering reports, on which the Government so heavily relies, have been rendered ineffectual through lack of clear definition. We have lost altogether the Engineering and Hydrology reporting on the Wivenhoe/Somerset transfers and in that regard were assisted by an engineer whose name appears on the Wivenhoe Dam plaque.

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We have the support of a Senior policy advisor to the Prime Minister whom we have kept informed from well before his election to Governing party. The support is on the basis that we have asked "An independent review of our material and their material and if there is something in it then a more detailed review be conducted". He has pointed out that it is the State Government responsibility but has conveyed his support to the Minister.

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As I have said previously, uncommon events themselves will be the ultimate arbitrator. The vision of them overflowing the dams and the water wasted will be powerful in persuading the citizens in SEQ that storage was the correct answer. Depleted dams can be attributed to any number of factors and the one selected "worst drought in 100 years" has a case to answer when the facts are applied.

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